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Abstract
We explore evidence on the perceived economic value of higher education to college
students in terms of their reported expected and shadow wages. Our estimates
provide predictions for expected wages that are similar across gender and become
closer to actual wages as students approach graduation. This is consistent with an
improvement in the quality of student information used to forecast wages. Shadow
wages relative to expected wages increase during the academic year for men and
are constant for women, which is consistent with the higher reluctance of women to
drop out of university. Finally, students with lower socioeconomic background and
poor performance exhibit a higher propensity to drop out.
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1 Introduction
Spain has experienced a sharp growth in the population share with higher education
since the 1980s (San Segundo, 1997). Having started as a country with relatively low
educational attainment, the percentage of young people with higher education is currently
fairly close to that in the US and is above the OECD average. However, international
comparisons suggest that this massive increase in participation in higher education is
accompanied by signicant imbalances. In particular, the increase in higher education
attainment is primarily observed for university degrees, whereas non-university higher
technical education, aimed at skilled blue collar jobs, has been disregarded (see Fina et
al., 2000; Petrongolo and San Segundo, 2002, among others). Moreover, there is an excess
of long-degree graduates and a lack of short-degree graduates (San Segundo, 2002; Salas
Velasco and Martín-Cobos Puebla, 2006)1. These imbalances may decrease the returns on
college education in Spain compared to other OECD countries, thus discouraging young
people from entering higher education.
This paper contributes to the ongoing debate by using micro data on studentsself-
reported economic value of higher education. In particular, we use a survey of Spanish
college students conducted in 2001, 2004 and 2005 to investigate their own monetary
valuation of a university degree. We analyze their answers on the wage they expect to
earn after completing their degree, as well as the shadow value that they assign to their
studies. This unique information allows us to focus on two distinct issues related to the
problem of career choice. First, we can explore the reported economic value of a college
degree by active college students, conditional on family background and personal and
academic characteristics. Second, we can assess to what extent self-reported measures of
expected and shadow wages are realistic by comparing them with average actual wages
for employees with higher education.
Since the survey wage variables are ordered categorical variables, whereby respondents
are o¤ered a choice among several monetary intervals, our baseline econometric model
consists of a discrete ordered choice model in which the thresholds correspond to known
monetary values. Unlike an ordered response model with unknown thresholds, we can
identify the scale of estimated parameters and thus obtain predictions of individual wages.
1We denote licenciaturas and ingeniero superior, which take ve academic years or more, as long
degrees. We denote diplomaturas and ingeniero técnico, which take three or four academic years, as short
degrees.
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Furthermore, we also check the potential attrition bias in wages and university studies
due to non-response, nding that the reasons for non-response are fairly exogenous with
respect to the wage determination models.
We estimate models for both expected and shadow wages, considering two di¤erent
subsamples according to the time for degree completion. Namely, we consider college
students in their rst and penultimate degree years. Our data set contains information
about the degree and academic year for each student, as well as gender, pre-university and
college academic performance, and socioeconomic background. We also include individual
information on degree choice by each student before entering university, and additional
reasons behind their degree choice.
Regarding expected wages, the most recent academic performance of the student ap-
pears to be the major determinant. The predictions obtained from the model reveal higher
expected wages for students closer to graduation. With respect to shadow wages, our re-
sults are in agreement with a simple model of investment in college education. In addition
to academic performance, factors related to family characteristics, among others, have a
substantial e¤ect on shadow wages. Unlike males, we nd that for females the shadow
wage relative to expected wages does not change with degree year, reecting their higher
relative reluctance to drop out of university.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe a simple
human capital investment model and dene the variables of interest to show the economic
value of a college education from the point of view of the student. Section 3 outlines the
data set, the variables, and alternative model specications. Sections 4 and 5 present the
econometric framework and our estimation results. Section 6 provides some concluding
remarks.
2 Theoretical framework
We use a stylized model of human capital accumulation and investment in education that
suits the needs of our empirical analysis based on Trostel (2004). For any individual, we
assume that her individual wage, W , is proportional to her amount of human capital,
2
H:2
W  = rH; (1)
where r is the users cost of human capital. The amount of accumulated human capital
H is assumed to be determined through the following production function:
dHt=dt = 'x

t y

tH

t ; (2)
where, at time t, x denotes the amount of time invested in human capital, y represents
those goods used in producing human capital, such as training services, physical capital,
etc.; and ' is a parameter representing individual productivity or capacity. Finally, ,
 and  denote the elasticities associated with each of the aforementioned variables. For
simplicity, and given that it is irrelevant for our analysis, we disregard the depreciation
of human capital. To focus on interior solutions, we impose that +  < 1.
Following Haley (1976), rst-order conditions for optimal production can be replaced
in the production function. Then the previous equation becomes:
dHt=dt = x
+
t H
+
t ; (3)
where
 = ' (yr=p); (4)
and p is the price of y. Since we are primarily concerned with human capital creation
through education, the amount of human capital created is measured in years of education.
Assuming that each year of education has the same impact on human capital accumulation
over time, and given that x remains constant, the previous equation can be simplied.
Without loss of generality, we can then consider x = 1 so that
dHt=dt = H

t (5)
for 0 < t < S, where  =  + , i.e., the elasticity of inputs can be accumulated. The
equation associated with the production function for human capital is a Bernoulli equation
2In other contributions, such as Blinder and Weiss (1976) and Rosen (1976), among others, an alter-
native, but essentially equivalent, denition is proposed, whereby the production technology of human
capital is linearly related to wages, although its productivity exhibits a non-linear relationship.
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with constant coe¢ cients. Denoting S as the total amount of education measured in years,
the solution to this equation after S years of education is:
HS =

H0e
S if  = 1
(H1 0 + (1  )S)1=(1 ) if  6= 1; (6)
whereH0 is the stock of human capital before schooling. If individual human capital before
and after schooling were observed, the hypothesis that the input elasticity  is equal to
one could be tested for. In general, a lack of data impedes testing such a hypothesis,
which is usually imposed by assumption. Under such conditions, substituting HS in the
relation between wages and human capital, W  = rH, and taking natural logarithms, we
obtain a linearized expression that provides an empirical relation between the logarithm
of wages and years of higher education:
lnW  = ln r + lnH0 + S: (7)
Since human capital before schooling is a function of individual factors, such as ability,
family and socioeconomic background, some of which are captured by observable factors,
Z, we parameterize H0 as:
H0 = exp(0 + 
0
1Z+ v); (8)
where v captures individual unobservable factors not captured by Z. Assuming that the
users cost of human capital r is constant, and using i to index individuals, the specication
becomes:
lnW i = + Si + 
0
1Zi + vi: (9)
2.1 Expected wages
The equation above, which posits a simple linear relation between observed individual
wages and schooling, allows us to obtain the average expected future wages of college
students under some additional assumptions. Assuming, without loss of generality, that
unobserved individual factors are on average equal to zero, the expected log wage for a level
of education S and a given set of observed individual factors equal to Z is +S + 01Z.
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Moreover, for a university student in the k-th academic year of her college degree,
her expected wage after graduation will depend on the information set determining her
expectation. In particular,
Ek(lnW
) = ek + 
e
kS + 
e0
1kZ+ Ek(v); (10)
where Ek() represents the mathematical expectation, conditional on her information set,
and ek, 
e
k, 
e
1k represent the expected returns in the wage equation of the corresponding
variables in that information set. Assuming that Ek(v) is equal to zero, then the expected
average wage becomes ek + 
e
kS + 
e0
1kZ.
Therefore, the di¤erential between average expected wages and average actual wages
arises from the di¤erences between the expected and actual returns of each variable,
[Ek(lnW
)  E(lnW )] = (ek   ) + (ek   )S + (e1k   1)0Z: (11)
Note that this di¤erential ultimately depends on the distribution of information across
students. Student information sets are related to the amount and quality of a students
knowledge about the economic value of her college degree, and to the time until receiving
a wage as a graduate, i.e., her prediction horizon. We thus expect that the gap between
expected and actual wages would be greatest at the beginning of a university course and
would decrease as the student approaches graduation.
2.2 Shadow wages
We dene as shadow wage the minimum real wage for which a student would be willing
to drop out of university in exchange for a job during her entire labor life.3 Decisions to
drop out are not only a function of the shadow wage, as dropouts stop bearing the fee
and time costs of achieving higher education.
Considering that retirement age occurs during period n, assuming a discount factor r,
we can formally dene the corresponding shadow wage ws for a student leaving college s
years after entering as:
3Given the way in which college students were asked about their shadow wages, it is understood that
the discounted real wage will remain constant over time.
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ws =
Ws +
nP
t=s+1
(1 + r) (t s)Wt
n  s :
If, instead of the stream of future wages, we consider the di¤erence between cumulative
wages in a lifetime with and without an investment in human capital G, we have:
vs =
Gs +
nP
t=s+1
(1 + r) (t s)Gt
n  s ;
where vs is the actual value of the investment in human capital G. This value has to
be greater than zero and by solving the equation for vs we can compute the maximum
interest rate to be paid for nancing such human capital investment.
Our model provides two predictions relative to shadow wages. First, if real wages
increase with on-the-job experience at a rate that o¤sets further education years, the
expected wage after graduation must be lower than the shadow wage. Second, as far as
the returns to university education are positive, the shadow wage must increase with years
of college education.
3 Data
3.1 The survey
The primary source of data is a survey nanced by the Madrid regional authority and
carried out in the academic years 2000/2001, 2003/2004 and 2004/2005. The survey
explored attitudes and opinions with regard to the higher education system of young
students registered in public universities in the Madrid region. The survey design is based
on a nationwide data set produced jointly by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas
(National Sociological Institute) and the Ministry of Education in 1990, known as Los
jóvenes ante la Universidad(Young people facing college education).
The innovation of our data set lies in two unique questions that are central to our
research, which refer to wages expected after graduation and shadow wages. Regarding
expected wages, each student is asked how much she believes her monthly wage will
be after concluding her studies: What is the monthly wage that you are expecting
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after graduating?. The answers provided by students are discretized into ve ordered
categories, in addition to no answer and Dont know. These categories are: between
450 and 901 euro; between 901 and 1803 euro; between 1803 and 3606 euro; between 3606
and 5409 euro; and more than 5409 euro. With respect to shadow wages, the question is:
What is the minimum monthly wage at which you would leave university in exchange for
an indenite contract with that real wage for your whole labor lifetime?The response
categories are the same as for expected wages.
In Table 1, we show the marginal relative frequencies of expected and shadow wages
for each wage category in our sample. Expected wages exhibit a remarkable unimodal
prole, whereby 53 percent of students chose the third category (between 1803 and 3606
euro per month). On the contrary, the sample shadow wages are distributed much more
uniformly for all categories above the minimum of 450 euro, although there is a substantial
level of right censoring, with 37 percent of students choosing the upper category. Despite
these di¤erences in the empirical distributions of expected and shadow wages, there is a
strong positive rank correlation between the variables, with a Kendall coe¢ cient of ordinal
correlation of 0:28 and the corresponding p-value below 0:01 percent. Unfortunately,
approximately one-third of students provided no answer or declared Dont know.
Our data set also contains information on gender, academic and personal status, and
socioeconomic background for each student. For the latter, there are data on parentsed-
ucation, their labor market status, and their income. The academic information provides
details on secondary studies completed by the respondent, the ranking of alternative uni-
versity studies considered, university studies actually followed, and college performance.
Information on secondary (pre-university) studies includes details such as whether the
secondary academic center was public or private (Public secondary), if the science eld of
specialization was attended (Science secondary), the examination grade needed to access
university (Access grade), and whether this examination was passed at the rst attempt
(Access at rst attempt). In terms of alternatives considered, respondents had to pro-
vide a prioritized list of alternative colleges within the Madrid university district and in
Spanish universities outside of Madrid considered. We included information on whether
the respondent also applied to colleges outside the Madrid university district (External
choices) and whether her rst three choices featured a particular degree that could be
chosen in several universities (Same degree) or di¤erent degree courses in a particular
university (Same university). Data on university studies included details on whether the
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course was the students rst choice (First choice), a long or a short degree, a Science
degree, or a joint degree leading to two university diplomas for two di¤erent disciplines.
Information on college performance includes the degree year of the course, whether
the student has failed and thus repeated an academic year (Repeater), whether she was
granted a scholarship (Grant), and whether she is working (Work) and/or searching for a
job.
Descriptive statistics of the main variables are provided in Table 2. Nearly 60 percent
of the respondents were women. Concerning family characteristics, approximately 20
percent reported that they belonged to a high-income household. Information on the
educational level of parents is collected in eight categories: illiterate, below primary,
completed primary, professional high school, lower secondary, complete secondary, short
university degree, and long university degree. We nd that the educational levels of
parents are highly correlated: the t-statistic for linear regression of mothers education
vs. fathers education is 28:72, with a Kendall statistic for ordinal correlation of 0:46
and a p-value of less than 0:001 percent. We thus concentrate on the educational level of
the fathers, in particular, whether the father has a university degree (University father).
The percentage of respondents whose father achieved a university degree (long or short)
amounts to 41 percent of the sample.4
Nearly 60 percent of the students undertook secondary studies in a public high school,
and approximately half followed a science eld of specialization in secondary education.
In terms of access grade (average examination grade achieved in secondary education,
which in our sample was truncated at 50) the minimum score required to enter university
was 68 points on average, and 84 percent of the respondent passed the access examination
at their rst attempt. With regard to alternative colleges considered, approximately 22
percent of students also applied elsewhere, 15 percent considered the same degree o¤ered
in di¤erent colleges, and only 7 percent prioritized a particular university.
Approximately 60 percent of the sample students are following courses corresponding
to their rst choice. Long degrees clearly dominate, accounting for 80 percent; of these,
4The remaining parental educational levels correspond to between 10 and 18 percent of respondents,
except for the two lower levels, which jointly account for 15 percent of the sample. Compared to the
Spanish population as a whole, the educational level of sample fathers is slightly above the average
educational level of Spanish parents with children of university age. This same result is observed if
we consider maternal education. This bias is coherent with the pervasive intergenerational inertia in
educational levels within the same family.
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approximately 40 percent correspond to science disciplines. The proportion of students
following a joint degree is very small. The performance of college students in our sample
can be summarized as follows. Less than 20 percent were awarded a grant; nevertheless,
it must be noted that grants are awarded for economic reasons if a minimum academic
performance is accomplished. Approximately 30 percent of the students have failed and
repeated at least one academic year, and one-fth of them reported that they are satised
with their studies. Finally, nearly 20 percent are also working (including full-time and
part-time work).
Splitting the sample statistics by gender reveals di¤erences in family income; the
percentage of students belonging to high-income households is clearly lower for females
than for males. However, the major di¤erences between men and women are related to
academic performance. Concerning pre-university performance, a higher percentage of
women passed the access examination at their rst attempt, and a higher proportion of
women are following degrees in colleges that were their rst choice. Women also seem to
perform better at college, with a higher proportion of grants awarded, a lower proportion
of repeaters, and a greater proportion reporting satisfaction. This preliminary information
thus provides evidence that female students are somewhat di¤erent than male students,
particularly in terms of academic performance. Nevertheless, the information in Table
2 only allows comparison of sample averages, and the di¤erences are not signicant in
many cases. Besides, a conditional analysis is needed to provide a proper account of these
apparent di¤erences.
3.2 Complementary data
We complement the information from our primary data source with the Survey of Wage
Structure, carried out by the National Institute of Statistics (INE hereafter, which is
the Spanish acronym) to investigate the structure and distribution of wages in Spain
for a variety of variables such as age, sex, education level, and region of residence. For
comparison with our primary data evidence, we use 2002 wage data.
The average monthly wage for dependent employees aged 2029 years is shown in Ta-
ble 3. Since this information is widely publicized and easily accessible, it is reasonable
to assume that it is part of the information set that university students used when com-
puting their expected wages. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the average wages in
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this complementary data set are representative of the population that voluntarily decide
to work at market wages, and therefore such information is potentially a¤ected by two
sources of selection bias. The rst source is related to the decision on labor participation,
which di¤ers for women and men. In the age range 2029 years, females exhibit a lower
participation rate than men. The second source arises from the fact that the Wage Distri-
bution Survey reports wage earnings for dependent employees, and therefore is restricted
to those who decide to be wage earners. However, it is not possible to control for these
sources of sample selection, since both participation decisions take place after graduation
and may thus be conditional on events that take place after the survey. In any case, we
use the data in Table 3 as a benchmark to evaluate expected and shadow wages of college
students in our sample.
Analysis of the data in Table 3 reveals three remarkable ndings. First, there is a
positive correlation between educational level and earnings. Second, average earnings are
greater for men than for women. Third, employees in the Madrid region enjoy earnings
above the national average. This is true for all educational levels and both genders, but
the di¤erential increases with the level of education. Di¤erences in the cost of living and
in job characteristics (industry, occupation) account for these di¤erentials.
Empirical evidence on the positive correlation between education and earnings, irre-
spective of place of residence and gender, matches one of the major predictions of the
theoretical framework in Section 2. This e¤ect may partly reect the fact that individuals
who are more able to undertake both academic and professional tasks are more moti-
vated to invest in education, and their return to education may be above average. Our
data do not allow us to control for this potential bias; we assume that the distribution
of unobserved capabilities of the students interviewed do not di¤er from the analogous
distribution in the Survey of Wage Structure.
In Table 4 we present the di¤erential returns to long university degrees for lower
educational levels in the Madrid region. The average wage di¤erential between those with
a long university degree and those without any university degree is approximately 60
percent. Nevertheless, this di¤erential does not capture the average wage di¤erential per
further year of education in the life cycle for two reasons. First, on average, the greater the
years of education for an individual, the higher is his age of entry into the labor market,
since many individuals do not enter the labor force until they have completed their studies.
Second, university degrees di¤er in the number of academic years required for completion,
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so that some are shorter than four years whereas others may be longer than ve years.
In the upper panel of Table 4, we nd that the wage di¤erential between graduates with
a long degree and those with a short degree, is much lower than the di¤erential between
long-degree graduates and non-graduates. In the lower panel of Table 4, we show the same
di¤erential returns corrected for the number of years needed to complete each education
level. The adjusted returns for long-degree male and female graduates, respectively, are
7:3 and 4:8 percent for those with secondary education, and 10:8 and 9:6 for those with
a technical secondary education.
A gender wage di¤erential is evident for all educational levels, but it decreases with
increasing education level. In more detail, there is a positive di¤erential for males that
ranges between 15 and 20 percent. Among the potential reasons for the gender gap, we
should mention three: pure gender discrimination; the possibility that, with all other
things equal, rm-specic accumulated human capital tends to be lower for women be-
cause they are more likely to experience discontinuities in their professional career; and
occupational segregation. In the latter case, women are more likely to face restrictions
that force them to choose occupations with lower wages in exchange for non-wage com-
pensations such as greater time exibility.
4 Econometric framework
4.1 Basic model
Our reference specication is Equation (9) in Section 2, which features the actual wage
conditional on the individuals level of education, personal characteristics, and socioeco-
nomic background:
lnW i = + Si + 
0
1Zi + vi (i = 1; : : : ; n): (12)
Nevertheless, unlike the objective information provided by actual wages observed for work-
ing individuals, we focus on the subjective valuation that the college students reported
for their university education. This subjective valuation provides two di¤erent values: the
expected wage, i.e., the wage that each student expects to earn as an outgoing graduate;
and the shadow wage, which is the minimum wage for a labor lifetime job for which the
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student would be willing to drop out of college without graduating. These data on ex-
pected and shadow wages reported by the college students allows us to analyze the value
of university education that college students attribute to higher education.
As already mentioned in Section 3, the students surveyed di¤ered in their academic
and personal information and in their degree year, so that there is individual heterogeneity
in their levels of human capital accumulation and other individual characteristics. Such
heterogeneity a¤ects the individual computation of expected and shadow wages. In par-
ticular, with all other things equal, di¤erences in the degree year, which reect the time
to completion, a¤ect the students opportunity cost of education, as well as the amount
and quality of her information. These di¤erences may thus lead to di¤erences in subjec-
tive valuation of the same college studies. To account for this, we distinguish among two
di¤erent groups according to the time for degree completion: college students in their rst
and in their penultimate degree years. Using this breakdown, the years of education for
each group can be taken as constant, and therefore Si will be part of the constant term
for each group.
In addition to the variables that characterize socioeconomic background and may be
associated with human capital accumulated before higher education, it is also important
to account for further individual characteristics. In particular, gender and the academic
curriculum during secondary education may have a systematic e¤ect on the subjective
valuation of wages. Thus, we extend the vector of covariates, denoting it asXi. In addition
to unobservables a¤ecting human capital obtained before higher education, there are
individual characteristics that are unobserved in the data that a¤ect subjective valuations.
Therefore, we can write our empirical model as:
lnW i = 
0Xi + ui: (13)
IfW i were observed, appropriate estimates of  could be obtained through OLS under
certain conditions. However, we have emphasized in Section 3 that we do not fully observe
W i , but a discretized version of it, Wi, that can be dened as:
Wi = j if j 1 < W

i < j (j = 1; : : : ; 5); (14)
where the values j, j = 1; : : : ; 5 are known. We can also dene indicator variables for
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each category as:
dij = 1(Wi = j) = 1(j 1 < W

i < j) (j = 1; : : : ; 5): (15)
The censored nature of the observed dependent variable Wi invalidates OLS as an
estimation method. We address this problem using the strategy developed for models
with multiple ordered responses that has been applied when using contingent-type data
as, for example, in Cameron and Quiggin (1994), Cai, Deilami and Train (1998), and
Papke (1998). Our empirical model is thus an ordered response model, yet in our case the
thresholds determining the di¤erent categories are known, so there is no need to estimate
them as parameters.
Even though the observed variable Wi is ordinal, knowing the cuto¤ points implies
that no normalization is required to identify the vector  and the likelihood function will
generally depend on both  and V ar(uijXi) = 2. Maximum likelihood estimation can
be carried out after assuming a distribution for ui, F (:). The probability that respondent
i chooses wage category j is:
Pr(Wi = jjXi) = Pr(j 1 < W i < j) (16)
= Pr(lnj 1 < lnW

i < lnj) (17)
= F (lnj   0Xi)  F (lnj 1   0Xi): (18)
Then the log-likelihood takes the form:
lnL(; ) =
X
i=1
X
j=1
dij ln Pr(Wi = jjXi):
Given our knowledge of thresholds, we can obtain projections for expected wages and
shadow wages as in a standard linear model. Note, in contrast, that if the cuto¤ points
were not known, the parameter vector would only be identied up to a normalization. In
such a case, it is usually assumed that  = 1 and, therefore the scale of  conveys no
information.
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4.2 Potential selection bias
The fact that a signicant proportion of respondents failed to declare their expected or
shadow wages and their university degree leads to a potential sample selection problem
(cf. Heckman, 1979). If the unobserved e¤ects in the respondentswages, ui, are cor-
related with random factors a¤ecting the probability of answering the wage question in
the survey, then using only the subsample of individuals who declare their wages will
produce inconsistent estimators. To evaluate the incidence of this potential bias, we an-
alyze a sample selection model in which, in addition to our wage equation, we considere
an auxiliary model to account for a respondents decision to declare her wages and her
university course, represented by a binary variable, Di, that equals 1 if the respondent
decides to give an answer and 0 otherwise. We further assume that the respondent decides
on whether to declare her wage or not on the basis of a score equation that is a linear
function of characteristics of which only some are observed in the data set. In particular,
Di = 1(
0Zi + "i > 0), (19)
where 1 () is a binary indicator that equals 1 if the condition in parentheses is true and 0
otherwise;  0Zi and "i capture observed and unobserved characteristics determining the
decision on whether to declare an answer. The unobserved term "i is assumed to have a
known cumulative distribution F"(:) that is symmetric around 0, so that the probability
that respondent i declares her wage is F"( 0Zi).
To account for potential selection bias, we reparameterize Equation (13) as:
lnW i = 
0Xi + "i +  i, (20)
where  represents correlation between the unobserved terms associated with selection
Equation "i and wage Equation ui, with V ar("ijZi) = 2". Under this new parame-
terization, we assume an orthogonal decomposition of the unobserved part of the wage
equation in two terms, one that is perfectly correlated with the unobserved part of the
binary decision on whether to declare a wage value, and an independent random error.
The probability that respondent i chooses category j can then be written as:
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Pr(Wi = jjXi; "i) = Pr(j 1 < W i < j) (21)
= Pr(lnj 1 < lnW

i < lnj) (22)
= F (lnj   0Xi   ""i)  F (lnj 1   0Xi   ""i). (23)
A non-signicant estimate of  would imply that, with regard to the wage equation
model, the sample selection associated with declaration of a wage value or not is exoge-
nous. In such a case, we could estimate the wage equation by ignoring sample selection at
no consistency cost. We have estimated a sample selection ordered probit model by max-
imum likelihood using the subroutines written for Stata by Miranda and Rabe-Hesketh
(2006). Unfortunately, estimation of this type of model is computationally very demand-
ing. Besides, concavity of the likelihood function is not guaranteed, so that convergence
cannot be achieved in the presence of a moderately low number of covariates. Thus, we
have estimated simplied versions of our wage specications with sample selection.
In either case, our estimates (not reported here) do not provide evidence against the
null hypothesis that sample selection was exogenous. This result suggests that condi-
tioning on the subsample of students with non-missing expected wage values does not
bias our estimates. Therefore, we can proceed to estimate the expected wage equation
using such a subsample without controlling for sample selection. We thus estimated our
specications for expected and shadow wages disregarding the potential attrition bias due
to non-response for wages and university studies.
5 Results
In this section, we analyze the valuation of university studies by college students in the
Madrid region as measured by their expected and shadow wages. Our estimates can be
subsequently used to compute individual predictions of both expected and shadow wages
for comparison with average actual wages for graduates working in Spain and in Madrid.
It must be recalled that values reported for expected and shadow wages represent
subjective valuations. In the case of expected wages, this means that interpretation of
the e¤ects of the conditioning variables is unclear. Such e¤ects combine the inuence of
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these variables on the potential actual wage, on the one hand, and the information quality
used in computing wage expectations, on the other.
Regarding the shadow wage, we are concerned with the extent to which family back-
ground, academic performance, and the degree year, among other things, a¤ect the income
required to prompt a student to drop out of university. Analysis of the shadow wage is
of double interest. First, we can learn about the permanent income predicted by college
students after entering the labor market as graduates, and how such permanent income
a¤ects their degree choice. Second, given the studentsexpectations about their perma-
nent income and their expected wage after graduation, we can assess whether their
estimates of future economic prospects are realistic compared to actual wages.
5.1 Expected wages and university education
To account for the degree year of the respondents, we estimate separately for two di¤erent
subsamples: rst degree year and penultimate degree year. We would expect the e¤ects
of the conditioning variables to di¤er very much for these two particular groups, which
correspond to extreme cases of the time to graduation. Namely, we would expect students
closer to completion to have much lower uncertainty about their academic prospects, as
well as a better knowledge of their job market prospects after graduation.
Expected wages are censored into ve wage categories, with the highest category being
unbounded to the right. Given that we observe wage thresholds, the scale of the parame-
ters is identied. Thus, the variance of the error term can be estimated, together with the
remaining parameters of interest, by maximum likelihood. Moreover, although both the
ordered probit and pointwise censored models are consistently estimated by maximum
likelihood, the latter is more e¢ cient as it exploits the information available on monetary
thresholds in the questionnaire.5
The maximum likelihood estimates for expected wages for students in their rst year
and penultimate year are reported in Tables 5 and 6, respectively. In each case, we report
5An important practical advantage of exploiting wage thresholds by means of the pointwise censored
model is that we do not need further assumptions about the distribution of the right tail to compute indi-
vidual expected wages. More precisely, in an ordered probit in which the information on threshold values
is not exploited, we must introduce an additional assumption for the right tail of the wage distribution
(for declared expected monthly wages above 5409 euro). Using results from the ordered probit estimates,
we nd that predicted individual expected wages are very sensitive to this additional assumption.
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unrestricted estimates in the rst column, and we excluded non-signicant covariates in
the last two columns, showing our preferred estimates in the last column. We concentrate
our comments on this nal specication. The model adjustment is reasonably good for
the two student groups. Given that we introduced di¤erent interactions related to the
type of university course (Long degree, Science degree, and Long degree in Science), the
reference group corresponds to short degrees in non-science disciplines.
Most estimated coe¢ cients in Tables 5 and 6, when signicant, show similar signs,
except for some qualications that are detailed below.
Most of the pre-university variables, particularly those related to access grade as a
measure of academic performance shortly before university entrance, seem to be relevant
in determining the expected wages of rst-year college students. Given the parameter
values, the net e¤ect of access grade is positive, but is more intense for students who
passed the access examination at their rst attempt. These variables are non-signicant
for students in later degree years, as observed in Table 6. For this student group, pre-
university performance loses relevance in favor of university performance.
The e¤ect of gender is negative, although it is not signicant for rst-year students.
This e¤ect is slightly positive for later-year female students in science disciplines.
Among family background variables, the high-income dummy is signicant and neg-
ative for rst-year students pursuing short degrees, and is positive but quantitatively
smaller for long-degree students. This result is reversed for later-year students. A univer-
sity graduate father has a positive e¤ect, and is clearly signicant for rst-year students.
Concerning academic performance (as measured through the variables Repeat, Grant,
Satised) in university, signicant e¤ects are only observed for long-degree students in
their penultimate year, with no e¤ect for rst-year students. Long-degree students in
non-science disciplines who have repeated declared lower expected wages. This negative
e¤ect was not observed for long-degree science students. The same is true for students who
reported satisfaction with their college studies. Award of a scholarship was eliminated
from the nal specication owing to its lack of signicance.
Finally, as expected, variables without direct inuence on the amount of human capital
acquired by the student, such as the reason for choosing a university course, are not
relevant in the determination of expected wages.
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In Table 7, we use our preferred expected wage estimates from Tables 5 and 6 to
predict student expected wages. We nd that the expected wages for any degree year
group are greater than average actual wages for graduate workers aged 2029 years in
Spain, and even in the Madrid region, where wages are higher. Hence, wage expectations
tend to be greater than actual wages; in other words, college students tend to overestimate
their potential wages. In addition to individual quality e¤ects, the individual covariates
also reect a students ability to compute expected wages.
Predictions of expected wages are higher for rst-year students than for penultimate-
year students. Expected wages for rst-year women are, on average, lower than those
for men in the same group. The fact that expected wages, on average, move closer to
actual wages for graduates demonstrates that the formulation of expectations improves
as students approach graduation. Finally, the percentage gap is much higher for women
than for men, reecting the wide wage di¤erential by gender. In the case of male students,
the di¤erential is substantial for those in their rst year and negligible for students closer
to completion. On the contrary, the gap between expected and actual wages for female
students remains large, even in teir penultimate year, and is smaller for long degrees than
for short ones.
The overestimation of expected wages with respect to actual wages for working gradu-
ates aged 2029 years is actually greater than the di¤erence reected in Table 7, because
the individuals in our sample are not strictly comparable with the sample for which aver-
age actual wages were computed, which is restricted to graduates aged 2029 years who
have decided to work and have found a job. In contrast, our sample comprises students
who have not yet graduated. For those who graduate, a percentage will eventually not
work, either because they decide not to enter the labor market or because they will not
nd a job. Moreover, a proportion of them will drop out of college before graduation.
Therefore, it is possible that the apparent improvement in the formulation of expectations
with increasing degree years merely reects sample selection of students who are much
more likely to work in jobs that require a university education.
5.2 Shadow wages and university education
We now analyze the determinants of lifetime labor income that university students would
accept in exchange for leaving university before graduation. It is worth mentioning that
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the fraction of students not declaring a shadow wage is greater than that not declaring
an expected wage.
In Tables 8 and 9, we present estimates of the pointwise censored model for rst- and
later-year students. Our empirical strategy closely follows the previous one for expected
wages. Again, the model adjustment is appropriate.
The e¤ect of gender is modest for rst-year students and negligible for later-year stu-
dents. Therefore, any substantial di¤erence in the prediction of shadow wages by gender
would arise because of di¤erences among individuals. Among the family background
variables, the high-income dummy is positive and signicant for the two student groups.
However, this e¤ect is minor for students in science disciplines.
Fathers education has a positive and signicant e¤ect for students in their rst and
penultimate degree years. This positive e¤ect on expected wages is in accordance with
the positive e¤ect of parental education on potential wages. Besides, we would expect
the quality of student information used to formulate wage expectations to improve with
fathers higher education, and therefore students with highly educated parents are less
likely to overestimate their expected wage relative to actual wages. These two e¤ects tend
to complement each other. The e¤ect of fathers education is even higher for students
closer to completion.
Concerning pre-university academic performance, grade achieved in the access ex-
amination, as a positive indicator of student quality, has a positive e¤ect for rst-year
students, and failure to pass this examination at the rst attempt has a signicant and
negative impact for all students. Other academic performance variables, such as sci-
ence specialization in pre-university education, are non-signicant for later-year students.
However, giving priority to the same degree in di¤erent universities has a negative and sig-
nicant impact in both groups. With regard to university academic performance, having
repeated a university year has a negative and signicant impact for all students.
Finally, unlike the results for expected wages, the reasons behind degree choice have
an impact on shadow wage determination for rst-year students. Family tradition and
Parental inuence exert positive and negative e¤ects, respectively. For later-year students,
only college proximity has a negative e¤ect on shadow wages.
In Table 10, we report the average predicted shadow wages. Shadow wages are, on
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average, greater for rst-year female students and smaller for later-year female students.
When comparing average shadow wages with average actual wages for working gradu-
ates aged 2029 years, the relative shadow wage is much greater for women. In Table
11, we report the percentage ratio of shadow wages to expected wages. The pattern is
remarkably di¤erent by gender, increasing for men and constant for women, in terms of
the degree year. The relative shadow wage for females equals, on average, the highest
relative shadow wage reported by men. Therefore, women are much more reluctant to
drop out of university. Alba-Ramirez and San Segundo (1995) found that whereas the
return to primary and secondary education in Spain is lower from women than for men,
the relative return to college education is higher for women. Hence, although female grad-
uates are, on average, worse paid than males, women enjoy a higher relative di¤erential
return to university education compared to lower educational levels. This result suggests
that investment in university education is more attractive for women than for men. It is
also consistent with the fact that more women than men have registered for university in
Spain since 1986.
5.3 Dropout propensity
According to our model, a student who reports a shadow wage lower than her expected
wage believes that her wage prole throughout her working life as a graduate will not
compensate for the cost of nishing her studies. Under these conditions, the student
is prompted to abandon her studies. In Table 12, we report the number of individuals
in this situation in our sample, broken down by degree year. A decreasing pattern for
dropout propensity is evident for long degrees. However, the pattern is fairly constant for
short-degree studies, which are more focused on technical jobs.
To analyze the factors that inuence this behavior, we used a probit model in which a
declared shadow wage lower than the declared expected wage was the dependent variable.
The results are presented in Table 13. The rst column presents results for students
excluding those in their last year. In the second and third columns, we report results
for students in their rst and penultimate year, respectively. The prole that describes
potential dropout can be summarized as a student with poor pre-university and university
performance, already a part-time student, with relatively low parental human capital and
whose parents inuenced her college and degree choice.
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These ndings have policy implications. Wage distribution by education level in Spain
is relatively narrow, so that the return to higher education is small relative to other OECD
countries. In fact, the dropout rate in Spain is remarkably high, which is mostly attributed
to failure of the educational system. Our analysis indicates an alternative explanation.
There are economic reasons related to observed variables that can explain, at least in
part, the dropout propensity in Spanish universities.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper deals with the economic value of university education measured in terms of
subjective valuations by college students. We used a microeconomic data set previously
exploited by Alonso-Borrego et al. (2007) that includes academic, personal and famil-
ial characteristics, as well as expected and shadow wages. Since declared wages were
discretized into ve categories, OLS estimation was inappropriate. However, we used in-
formation on wage thresholds to obtain more e¢ cient estimates than those provided by a
standard ordered probit model.
Di¤erences in time to completion may a¤ect subjective valuation of studies by students.
Such di¤erences may a¤ect individual processing of relevant information. For this reason,
we considered two di¤erent subsamples, rst-year and penultimate-year students.
We found that academic performance was the main determinant of expected wages.
There were also di¤erences depending on the student degree year, so that expected wages
depended on pre-university academic performance for rst-year students and on college
performance for later-year students. Comparison of predicted expected wages with actual
wages for young working graduates revealed a positive gap on average. This gap tended
to narrow for later degree years. This result reects the fact that expectations became
more realistic as students approached graduation.
In relation to shadow wages, the results are consistent with our theoretical framework.
In particular, positive academic performance and family background tend to increase
shadow wages. The shadow wage predictions obtained from our estimations are also con-
sistent with the theory. In particular, the precision in predicting shadow wages improves
for later-year students. Interestingly, women show a steady pattern in the ratio of shadow
to expected wages. Therefore, unlike men, their relative shadow wage is very high from
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the start of their university degree course.
We used a rich information set that included degree characteristics in terms of disci-
pline and length, which confers robustness to our results.
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Table 1
Monthly expected and shadow wages of Madrid college students
Relative frequency (%)
Expected Shadow
Between 450 and 901 euro 4:89 2:07
Between 901 and 1803 euro 17:87 14:51
Between 1803 and 3606 euro 52:66 17:94
Between 3606 and 5409 euro 13:79 28:15
More than 5409 euro 10:80 37:32
Number of observations 1371 1254
Source: Young people towards university, 2001, 2004 and 2005.
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Table 2
Main variables and descriptive statistics
All Female Male
Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Female 0:57 0:50
Family
High income 0:19 0:39 0:14 0:35 0:26 0:44
University father 0:41 0:49 0:40 0:49 0:42 0:49
Pre-university
Public secondary 0:58 0:49 0:59 0:49 0:57 0:49
Science secondary 0:52 0:50 0:50 0:50 0:54 0:50
Access grade 67:78 9:32 67:69 9:50 67:90 9:07
Examination passed at rst attempt 0:84 0:37 0:87 0:34 0:81 0:40
Choice set
External choice 0:22 0:42 0:24 0:43 0:21 0:41
Same degree 0:15 0:35 0:15 0:36 0:14 0:35
Same university 0:07 0:26 0:07 0:26 0:06 0:25
University degree chosen
First choice 0:61 0:49 0:66 0:47 0:54 0:50
Long degree 0:80 0:40 0:79 0:41 0:81 0:39
Science degree 0:46 0:50 0:44 0:50 0:50 0:50
Science long degree 0:34 0:47 0:32 0:46 0:36 0:48
Joint degree 0:01 0:10 0:01 0:08 0:02 0:12
College performance
Grant 0:17 0:37 0:18 0:39 0:15 0:35
Repeater 0:30 0:46 0:27 0:45 0:35 0:48
Satised 0:21 0:41 0:25 0:43 0:16 0:37
Working 0:18 0:39 0:18 0:39 0:18 0:39
Survey year
2004 0:31 0:46 0:25 0:43 0:40 0:49
2005 0:56 0:50 0:61 0:49 0:50 0:50
Source: Young people towards university, 2001 2004 and 2005.
All the variables are binary except for Access grade, which ranges between 50 and 100.
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Table 3
Monthly average earnings by educational level completed
Employees aged 2029 years
National average
Secondary Technical Short degree Long degree
All 1357 1359 1774 1995
Men 1538 1554 1999 2178
Women 1192 1147 1615 1843
Madrid average
All 1417 1389 1960 2226
Men 1617 1578 2191 2505
Women 1243 1223 1769 2002
Percentage wage gap between Madrid and the national average
All 4:42 2:18 10:48 11:57
Men 5:14 1:55 9:59 15:01
Women 4:34 6:65 9:57 8:62
Source: Survey of wage structure, 2002 (INE)
Table 4
Monthly average earnings by educational level completed
in Madrid relative (%) to long-degree graduates
Unadjusted
Secondary Technical Short degree
Men 54:90 58:70 14:33
Women 61:01 63:66 13:16
Adjusted for years spent in higher education
Secondary Technical Short degree
Men 7:32 10:77 4:75
Women 4:84 9:64 4:84
Source: Survey of wage structure, 2002 (INE) and
our own calculations.
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Table 5
Expected wage for rst-year college students
Pointwise censored model without selection
Public secondary  0:0404  0:0329
Access grade  0:0078  0:0074  0:0076
Access at rst attempt  0:7658  0:7135  0:7231
First attempt  Access grade 0:0114 0:0108 0:0107
External choice  0:1175  0:1175  0:1229
University father 0:1066 0:1071 0:1212
Science secondary  0:2549  0:2606  0:2571
Grant  0:0696  0:0703
First choice  0:0494  0:0579
Same degree  0:097  0:1021  0:0929
Same university  0:0391  0:0308
Joint degree 0:3128 0:3228 0:3523
Reason: Family tradition  0:0264
Reason: Economic independence 0:0695
Reason: University proximity 0:0115
Reason: Vocation  0:0715
Reason: Parental inuence 0:0391
Reason: Di¢ culty  0:1053  0:0960  0:0799
Science degree 0:1294 0:1219 0:1954
Long degree  0:1979  0:1934  0:0818
Science long degree 0:2177 0:2391 0:2148
Female  0:3301  0:3245  0:1648
Repeater 0:1271 0:1263 0:0998
Satised 0:4818 0:4720 0:3154
Working  0:2304  0:215  0:043
High income  0:4202  0:4304  0:3335
Science degree Female 0:2356 0:2418
Science degree  Repeater  0:1909  0:1675
Science degree  Satised  0:6375  0:6383  0:3911
Science degree  Work  0:0074  0:0085
Science  High income 0:5913 0:6156 0:5239
Long degree Female 0:3066 0:2927 0:1297
Long degree Repeater  0:0251  0:009
Long degree Satised  0:1698  0:1676
Long degree Work 0:2288 0:2073
Long degree High income 0:5403 0:5591 0:4618
Science long degree Female  0:4067  0:4078  0:1653
Science long degree Repeater 0:212 0:1758
Science long degree Satised 0:2783 0:2879
Science long degree Work 0:0687 0:0668
Science long degree High income  0:4825  0:5247  0:4227
Of the 371 observations, 68 were right-censored.
,  and  denote signicance at 20, 10 and 5 percent, respectively.
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Table 6
Expected wage for penultimate-year college students
Pointwise censored model without selection
Public secondary  0:0238  0:0252
Access grade  0:0005  0:0013
Access at rst attempt  0:1932  0:262
First attempt  Access grade 0:002 0:0031
External choice 0:0509 0:0422
University father 0:0934 0:0832 0:0848
Science secondary 0:0129  0:0056
Grant  0:0396  0:0352
First choice  0:1054  0:0919  0:0961
Same degree  0:0088  0:0031
Same university 0:1173 0:0843
Reason: Family tradition  0:0556
Reason: Economic independence 0:0254
Reason: University proximity  0:0444
Reason: Vocation  0:0458
Reason: Parental inuence  0:0527
Reason: Di¢ culty  0:0123
Science degree 0:1853 0:1997 0:2268
Long degree 0:3281 0:2972 0:4459
Science long degree  0:4938  0:5035  0:5356
Female  0:4178  0:4554  0:2337
Repeater 0:3260 0:3496 0:1221
Satised 0:2692 0:2741 0:3118
Working 0:4596 0:4516 0:2992
High income 0:5094 0:4874 0:5395
Science degree  Female 0:4813 0:5107 0:3626
Science degree  Repeater  0:2592  0:306
Science degree  Satised  0:4393  0:4355  0:4387
Science degree  Work  0:2392  0:2749
Science degree  High income  0:6270  0:6174  0:6107
Long degree Female 0:2094 0:2591
Long degree Repeater  0:4782  0:4964  0:2755
Long degree Satised  0:4429  0:4457  0:4820
Long degree Work  0:5164  0:5108  0:3580
Long degree High income  0:4686  0:4457  0:5123
Science long degree Female  0:1095  0:1291
Science long degree Repeater 0:8237 0:8604 0:5666
Science long degree Satised 0:7883 0:7879 0:7754
Science long degree Work 0:217 0:2649
Science long degree High income 0:3801 0:3851 0:3937
Of the 279 observations, 15 were right-censored. See notes to Table 5.
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Table 7
Monthly average expected wages for college students
in Madrid by degree year
In euro
Short degree Long degree
First Penult. First Penult.
year year year year
Male 3070 2351 3811 2646
973 654 1202 567
Female 2857 2232 3161 2200
882 719 1060 671
Percentage di¤erence between average expected wage and
Spanish average actual wages for working graduates
Short degree Long degree
First Penult. First Penult.
year year year year
Male 53:6 17:6 75:0 21:5
Female 77:0 38:2 71:5 19:4
Percentage di¤erence between average expected wage and
Madrid average actual wages for working graduates
Short degree Long degree
First Penult. First Penult.
year year year year
Male 40:1 7:3 52:1 5:6
Female 61:5 26:2 57:9 9:9
Source: Calculated from Young people facing
university, 2001, 2004 and 2005 and Survey of wage structure.
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Table 8
Shadow wage for rst-year college students
Pointwise censored model without selection
Public secondary  0:0369  0:0389
Access grade 0:0346 0:0343 0:0329
Access at rst attempt 2:1966 2:1797 2:1094
First attempt  Access grade  0:0334  0:0331  0:0322
External choice 0:2713 0:2691 0:2494
University father 0:1470 0:1481 0:1550
Science secondary  0:3113  0:3082  0:2846
Grant  0:1416  0:1484  0:1602
First choice 0:0112 0:0158
Same degree  0:2929  0:2850  0:2851
Same university 0:1638 0:1602
Joint degree 2:8507 2:8588 2:9169
Reason: Family tradition 0:3637 0:3638 0:3795
Reason: Economic independence 0:1283 0:1273 0:1427
Reason: University proximity 0:0761 0:0733
Reason: Vocation 0:1067 0:1116
Reason: Parental inuence  0:2291  0:2314  0:2325
Reason: Di¢ culty  0:0237  0:0163
Science degree 0:3037 0:1322 0:1778
Long degree 0:063  0:0903 0:0321
Science long degree  0:1009 0:0944 0:0941
Female 0:1648 0:0308 0:1361
Repeater  0:306  0:3841  0:2610
Satised 0:1841 0:0931 0:1629
Work  0:1773  0:3545  0:3633
High income 0:5755 0:5357 0:6799
Science degree  Female  0:073 0:0783
Science degree  Repeater 0:1887 0:2697 0:2269
Science degree  Satised  0:1635  0:0275
Science degree  Work 0:1735 0:3774 0:3572
Science degree  High income  0:4332  0:3831  0:4126
Long degree  Female  0:0487 0:0935
Long degree  Repeater 0:105 0:1866
Long degree satised  0:0086 0:1012
Long degree work 0:1384 0:3304 0:3237
Long degree high income 0:1057 0:1494
Science  Long degree female 0:1725
Science long degree repeater 0:0902
Science long degree satised 0:1852
Science long degree work 0:247
Science long degree high income 0:0607
Constant 5:3869 5:5431 5:6008
Year 2004  0:2412  0:24  0:2316
Year 2005 0:6513 0:6542 0:6777
Of the 360 observations, 156 were right-censored. See notes to Table 5.
31
Table 9
Shadow wage for penultimate-year college students
Pointwise censored model without selection
Public secondary 0:0681 0:0721
Access grade 0:0176 0:0176 0:0179
Access at rst attempt 1:5365 1:4972 1:4791
First attempt  Access grade  0:0265  0:0258  0:0251
External choice  0:0054  0:0041 0:0091
University father 0:3693 0:3733 0:3876
Science secondary 0:1640 0:1817 0:1724
Grant 0:0586 0:0607 0:0717
First choice 0:089 0:0918
Same degree  0:2344  0:2439  0:2760
Same university 0:0183 0:0172
Reason: Family tradition 0:0198 0:0133
Reason: Economic independence  0:085  0:0767
Reason: University proximity  0:1572  0:1565  0:1776
Reason: Vocation 0:0735 0:0627
Reason: Parental inuence  0:0162  0:0088
Reason: Di¢ culty  0:0374  0:036
Science degree 0:3726 0:3888 0:4692
Long degree 0:3738 0:3977 0:4657
Science long degree  0:377  0:4157  0:4259
Female  0:1595  0:1327  0:0512
Repeater  0:2618  0:4044  0:2873
Satised  0:0834 0:0634 0:0756
Work  0:0136  0:1045  0:0925
High income 0:4231 0:4339 0:3440
Science  Female 0:2015 0:1613
Science  Repeater 0:2744 0:4274 0:2978
Science satised 0:219 0:0135
Science  Work  0:3373  0:2026
Science  High income  0:4724  0:4964  0:4918
Long degree  Female 0:07 0:0381
Long degree  Repeater  0:005 0:155
Long degree  Satised 0:5208 0:3261 0:3020
Long degree  Work  0:0073 0:0924
Long degree  High income  0:0779  0:1012
Science  Long-degree female  0:0822
Science Long degree  Repeater 0:2071
Science Long degree  Satised  0:3798
Science Long degree  Work 0:1642
Science Long degree  High income  0:0156
Of the 256 observations, 98 were right-censored
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Table 10
Monthly average shadow wages for college students
in Madrid by degree years
In euro
Short degree Long degree
First Penult. First Penult.
year year year year
Male 3953 4556 5796 5401
1597 1917 5550 1961
Female 5344 4042 6613 5126
2524 1875 8555 2325
Percentage di¤erence between average shadow wage and
Spanish average actual wages for working graduates
Short degree Long degree
First Penult. First Penult.
year year year year
Male 97:7 127:9 166:1 148:0
Female 231:0 150:3 258:8 178:1
Percentage di¤erence between average shadow wage and
Madrid average actual wages for working graduates
Short degree Long degree
First Penult. First Penult.
year year year year
Male 80:4 107:9 131:4 115:6
Female 202:1 128:5 230:3 156:0
Source: Calculated from Young people facing
university, 2001, 2004 and 2005 and Survey of wage structure.
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Table 11
Shadow wage relative to expected wage
based on model predictions (%)
Short degree Long degree
First Penult. First Penult.
year year year year
Male
Weighted mean 128:8 193:7 152:1 204:1
Unweighted mean 135:5 197:3 154:0 206:8
Standard deviation 61:8 73:7 134:6 67:2
Female
Weighted mean 187:1 181:1 209:2 233:0
Unweighted mean 188:7 179:8 206:0 235:7
Standard deviation 79:1 60:0 167:0 90:7
Table 12
Dropout propensity: Shadow wage lower than expected wage
Short degree Long degree
Degree year No Yes No Yes
1 67 17 239 51
(20:2) (17:6)
2 75 12 166 52
(13:8) 23:9
3 75 22 206 17
(22:7) (7:6)
4 167 8
(4:6)
5 77 3
(3:8)
Percentages are in parentheses.
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Table 13
Dropout propensity: Shadow wage lower than expected wage
Probit estimation
Public secondary  0:1115 0:0709  0:0176
Access grade  0:0486  0:0220  0:2204
Examination passed at rst attempt  2:9789  0:2450  17:0646
Access grade  Pass rst attempt 0:0465 0:0086 0:2699
External choice  0:7108  0:7584  0:1132
University father  0:2753  0:2257  0:5828
Science secondary 0:2343 0:2127  0:6533
Grant 0:1137 0:3861 0:2462
First choice  0:2512 0:1489  1:3666
Same degree 0:1179 0:3779  0:0632
Same university 0:0464  0:2980 1:2897
2 years to nish 0:3392
3 years to nish 0:7390
4 years to nish 0:7776  0:1737
Reason: Family tradition  0:5536  0:6094  0:5747
Reason: Economic independence  0:0709 0:0797 0:0431
Reason: University proximity  0:0032  0:3089 0:1504
Reason: Vocation 0:0435  0:0293  0:1648
Reason: Parental inuence 0:2534 0:3515 0:8895
Reason: Di¢ culty 0:2209 0:0749  0:2339
Science degree  1:3243 0:8658  3:8564
Long degree  1:1524 0:5112  0:2706
Science long degree 1:6119
Female  0:9715 0:1766  1:1201
Repeater 0:7219 1:3921 2:0852
Satised  0:3552  1:1188  0:8186
Work 0:9778 2:8072 2:5596
High income  1:5357  12:473  2:2297
Science degreeFemale 1:7701  0:2088 3:5163
Science degreeRepeater  0:2198  1:2349  0:1294
Science degreeSatised  0:5087  0:0925 0:1625
Science degreeWork  1:3867  3:0404
Science degreeHigh income 1:3776 0:9863
Long degreeFemale 0:9396  0:3773 0:1267
Long degreeRepeater  0:2527  0:2899  2:4192
Long degreeSatised 0:4157 1:2169
Long degreeCurrently working  0:8376  2:5867  2:4273
Long degreeHigh income 0:2795  0:7257
Science long degreeFemale  1:9684  0:4973 1:6465
Science long degreeRepeater 0:1071 0:5425
Science long degreeSatised 0:1876
Science long degreeWork 0:8735 1:9744
Science long degreeHigh income  0:8945 0:5748
No. of observations 889 310 180
log-likelihood  270:3  107:6  31:2
Chi-square 172:7 100:4 96:0
Degrees of freedom 45 41 33
See Notes to Table 5.
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